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Abstract—Number theoretic public key solutions are sub-
ject to various quantum attacks making them less attractive
for longer term use. Certain group theoretic constructs
show promise in providing quantum-resistant cryptographic
primitives. We introduce a new protocol called a Meta Key
Agreement and Authentication Protocol (MKAAP) that has
some characteristics of a public key solution and some
of a shared-key solution. Then we describe the Ironwood
MKAAP, analyze its security, and show how it resists
quantum attacks. We also show Ironwood implemented on
several IoT devices, measure its performance, and show how
it performs better than existing key agreement schemes.
Index Terms—Group Theoretic Cryptography, E-
Multiplication, Braids
I. INTRODUCTION
Group theoretic cryptography is a relatively new dis-
cipline and overviews can be found in the two recent
monographs [11], [19]. A number of group theoretic
key agreement protocols have been introduced in the
last two decades, including [3] and [16], but attacks on
the conjugacy search problem such as those appearing
in [8], [9], [14] suggest that these types of schemes
may not be practical over braid groups in low resource
environments. To overcome these deficiencies, in this
paper, we introduce the notion of a meta key agreement
and authentication protocol (MKAAP) (see §IV) which
has many of the properties of a public key method but
relies on the clever distribution of certain private keys.
Starting with a quantum-resistant one-way function
based in braid group theory we’ve constructed an
MKAAP which we present in this paper. This MKAAP
is very robust and is immune from all known attacks
introduced in group theoretic cryptography and delivers
linear time performance on low footprint processors.
Previous Work
In 2006 [1] introduced a key agreement protocol based
in group theory (specifically the braid group) that with-
stood several attacks over the past decade. First [18]
determined that if braids are too short then it’s possible
to find the conjugating factor and use that to break the
system. However it was pointed out in [12] that in practice
the braids are long enough that this attack can never
succeed in practice. It’s akin to using Fermat to factor
short RSA keys. Second, [15] showed a linear algebra
attack (KTT) that would allow an attacker to determine
part of the private key data. However, [10] showed that
this is just a class of weak keys and by choosing the
private key data in a specific way this attack is defeated.
More recently [6] built upon the defeated KTT attack,
and using all of the public information were able to, after
a large precomputation, spend several hours to reconstruct
the shared secret. This attack not only required access to
the public parameters but also both public keys (including
their permutations). It was shown in [2] that the attack
work grows as the size of the permutation order grows as
well as the size of the braid group.
Still, none of these attacks targeted the underlying
hard problems in the braid group, or attempted to at-
tack the one-way function introduced in [1] called E-
Multiplication.
Our Contribution
This paper introduces the Ironwood meta key agree-
ment and authentication protocol whose security is based
on hard problems in group theory. Ironwood leverages the
one-way function, E-Multiplication, but creates a different
construction that removes some of the public information
required to mount any of the previous attacks. In addition
to being immune from previous attacks, Ironwood is also
quantum resistant. Specifically, Shor’s quantum algorithm
[20] which has been shown to break RSA, ECC, and sev-
eral other public key crypto systems does not seem appli-
cable for attacking Ironwood. Further, Grover’s quantum
search algorithm [21] is not as impactful on Ironwood due
to the fact that the running time of Ironwood is linear in
the key length.
This paper first reviews the braid group and colored
Burau represtation. Next it reviews E-Multiplication, and
then introduces the meta key agreement and authentica-
tion protocol. Following that it introduces Ironwood and
presents a security analysis.
II. COLORED BURAU REPRESENTATION OF THE BRAID
GROUP
Let BN denote the braid group on N strands with Artin
presentation
BN =
〈
b1, b2, . . . , bN−1
∣∣∣∣
σiσjσi = σjσiσj for |i − j| = 1
σiσj = σjσi for |i − j| ≥ 2
〉
.
Every β ∈ BN determines a permutation σβ ∈ SN , the
group of permutations of N letters, as follows. For 1 ≤
i < N , define σi ∈ SN be the ith simple transposition,
which maps i→ i+ 1, i+ 1→ i, and leaves {1, . . . , i−
1, i + 2, . . . , N} fixed. We may take σbi = σi. Then if
β = bǫ1i1 b
ǫ2
i2
· · · bǫkik , (with ǫi = ±1), it is easy to see that
σβ = σi1 · · ·σik .
The colored Burau representation of the braid group
was introduced by Morton in [17] in 1998, but we
shall make use of a variation of Morton’s original rep-
resentation. Associate to each Artin generator bi, with
1 ≤ i < N , a colored Burau matrix CB(bi) where
CB(b1) =


−t1 1
.
.
.
1
.
.
.
1


,
CB(bi) =


1
.
.
.
ti −ti 1
.
.
.
1


(
for 1 < i < N
)
.
(1)
We similarly define CB(b−1i ) by modifying (1)
slightly:
CB(b−11 ) =


1 − 1
t2
.
.
.
1
.
.
.
1


,
CB(b−1i ) =


1
.
.
.
1 − 1
ti+1
1
ti+1
.
.
.
1


(
for 1 < i < N
)
.
(2)
Thus each braid generator bi (respectively, inverse
generator b−1i ) determines a colored Burau/permutation
pair (CB(bi), σi) (resp., (CB(b−1i ), σi)). We now wish
to define a multiplication of colored Burau pairs such that
the natural mapping from the braid group to the group of
matrices with entries in the ring of Laurent polynomials
in the ti is a homomorphism.
Given a Laurent polynomial
f(t1, . . . , tN ) ∈ Z[t±11 , t±12 , . . . , t±1N ],
a permutation in σ ∈ SN can act (on the left) by
permuting the indices of the variables. We denote this
action by f 7→ σf :
σf(t1, t2, . . . , tN) = f(tσ(1), tσ(2), . . . , tσ(N)).
We extend this action to N × N matrices over
Z[t±11 , t
±1
2 , . . . , t
±1
N ] denoted, M, by acting on each entry
in the matrix, and denote the action in the same way.
The general definition for multiplying two colored Burau
pairs is now defined as follows from the definition of the
semi direct product M⋊ SN . Given b±i , b±j , the colored
Burau/permutation pair associated with the product b±i ·b±j
is
(CB(b±i ), σi) ◦ (CB(b±j ), σj) =(
CB(b±i ) · (σiCB(b±j )), σi · σj
)
.
Given any braid
β = bǫ1i1 b
ǫ2
i2
· · · bǫkik ,
with ǫi = ±1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the colored Burau pair
(CB(β), σβ) is given by
(CB(β), σβ) =
= (CB(bǫ1i1 ) · σi1CB(bǫ2i2 ) · σi1σi2CB(bǫ3i3 )) · · ·
σi1σi2 ···σik−1CB(bǫkik ), σi1σi2 · · ·σik ).
The colored Burau representation is then defined by
ΠCB(β) := (CB(β), σβ).
One checks that ΠCB satisfies the braid relations and,
hence, defines a representation of BN .
III. E-MULTIPLICATION
E-Multiplication was first introduced in [1] as a one-
way function used as a building block to create multiple
cryptographic constructions. We recall its definition here.
Let Fq denote the finite field of q elements. A set of
T-values is defined to be a collection of non-zero field
elements:
{τ1, τ2, . . . , τN} ⊂ F×q .
Given a set of T-values, we can evaluate any Laurent
polynomial f(t1, t2, . . . , tN ) to obtain an element of Fq:
f(t1, t2, . . . , tN ) ↓t-values := f(τ1, τ2, . . . , τN ).
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We extend this notation to matrices over Laurent polyno-
mials in the obvious way.
With all these components in place we can now define
E-Multiplication. By definition, E-Multiplication is an
operation that takes as input two ordered pairs,
(M,σ0), (CB(β), σβ),
where β ∈ BN and σβ ∈ SN as before, and where M ∈
GL(N,Fq), and σ0 ∈ SN . We denote E-Multiplication
with a star: ⋆. The result of E-Multiplication, denoted
(M ′, σ′) = (M,σ0) ⋆ (CB(β), σβ),
will be another ordered pair (M ′, σ′) ∈ GL(N,Fq)×SN .
We define E-Multiplication inductively. When the braid
β = b±i is a single generator or its inverse, we put
(M,σ0) ⋆
(
CB(b±i
)
, σb±
i
) =
(
M · σ0(CB(b±i )) ↓t-values, σ0 · σb±
i
)
.
In the general case, when β = bǫ1i1 b
ǫ2
i2
· · · bǫkik , we put
(M,σ0) ⋆ (CB(β), σβ) =
(M,σ0) ⋆ (CB(b
ǫ1
i1
), σbi1 ) ⋆ (CB(b
ǫ2
i2
), σbi2 )⋆
· · · ⋆ (CB(bǫkik ), σbik ),
(3)
where we interpret the right of (3) by associating left-
to-right. One can check that this is independent of the
expression of β in the Artin generators.
IV. META KEY AGREEMENT AND AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOL (MKAAP)
We now introduce the notion of a meta key agreement
and authentication protocol which is not a true public key
crypto system but has many of the features of a public key
cryptosystem. Specifically, while it does require secure
provisioning of each device by a Trusted Third Party
(TTP), once provisioned, devices can authenticate to each
other offline without further support. By a device, we
mean a machine that can execute a cryptographic protocol
and be capable of transmitting and receiving messages.
Definition (MKAAP) Assume there is a network consist-
ing of a Home Device (HD) and a set of other devices (Di,
i=1,2,3,. . . ) that communicate with the HD over an open
channel. Assume that there is a TTP which has distributed
secret information to the HD and the other devices. An
MKAAP is an algorithm with the following properties:
• The MKAAP allows the HD to authenticate (and/or
be authenticated by) and obtain a shared secret with any
Di over an open channel.
• It is infeasible for an attacker, eavesdropping on
the open communication channel between the HD and
a device Di, to obtain the shared secret assuming the
attacker does not know the secret keys distributed by the
TTP.
• The private keys of the Di are provided by the TTP,
fixed, and are not known to the HD. The TTP may update
the keys over time.
• The private key of the HD may be ephemeral and is
not known to any of the Di’s, or it may be provided by
the TTP.
• If an attacker can break into one of the devices Di
and obtain its private key, then only the security of that
particular device is breached, all other devices remain
secure.
V. IRONWOOD MKAAP
We now describe the Ironwood MKAAP. It may be
assumed that the following information is publicly known.
Public Information:
• The braid group BN for a fixed even integer N .
• A finite field Fq of q elements.
• A non-singular matrix m0 ∈ GL(N,Fq).
• The operation of E-multiplication based on BN and
Fq .
Next, we discuss the initial distribution of secret infor-
mation by the TTP.
TTP Data Generation and Distribution:
The TTP creates two sets of commuting conjugates:
Cα = {zα1z−1, zα2z−1, . . . , zαrz−1},
Cγ = {zγ1z−1, zγ2z−1, . . . , zγrz−1} ∈ BN ,
where some portion of the αi are purebraids (i.e., have a
trivial permutation), and one set of T-values:
T = {τ1, τ2, . . . , τN} ⊂ Fq, (τi 6= 0, 1).
The TTP writes the first set of conjugates Cα and the set
T into the memory of the Home Device (HD).
Next, the TTP creates braid words βi ∈ BN (for
i = 1, 2, . . .) which are random products of conjugates
from the second set Cγ and creates the colored Burau
pairs (βi, σi) where σi is the permutation associated to
βi. For each such (βi, σi), the TTP chooses a random
non-singular matrix
Ci =
N−1∑
k=0
ck,im
k
0 ,
(
with ck,i ∈ Fq
)
,
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and using T performs the E-multiplication
Pubi := (Ci, Id) ⋆ (βi, σi) = (CiMi, σi).
Here Id is the identity permutation and Mi ∈ GL(N,Fq).
Finally, the TTP creates a certificate Certi which contains
a digitally signed copy of Pubi and writes Certi and Ci
into the memory of Di, the ith device in the network.
Once the TTP distribution is completed authentication
and key agreement between the Home Device and the
other devices in the network may begin. The protocol
proceeds as follows.
Ironwood Authentication and Key Agreement Prototol
Step 1: The device Di sends HD the certificate Certi
which contains a copy of Pubi which has been digitally
signed by the TTP. Here Pubi is the public key of Di and
the matrix Ci is the private key of Di.
Step 2: The HD generates two ephemeral non-singular
matrices
C =
N−1∑
k=0
ckm
k
0 , C
′ =
N−1∑
k=0
c′km
k
0 ,
(
with ck, c′k ∈ Fq
)
.
Step 3: The HD generates an ephemeral permutation
σ and two ephemeral braids β, β′ which are random
words in Cα and which have the same permutation
σ = σβ = σβ′ . This can be accomplished efficiently by
first generating a braid using the first half of conjugates,
and then create the second braid by using the same set of
conjugates and adding choices from the set of conjugates
where αi are purebraids.
Remark: This completes the construction of the
ephemeral part of the private key of the HD which consists
of C,C′, β, β′, σ. The T-values and the set of conjugates
Cα are also part of the private key of the HD and must
be treated as confidential information.
Step 4: Using T , the HD computes the following two
E-multiplications:
(C, Id) ⋆ (β, σ) := (CM,σ),
(C′, Id) ⋆ (β′, σ) := (C′M ′, σ).
Step 5: The HD has received Pubi = (CiMi, σi) in
the signed digital signature sent by Di. Next, using T ,
the HD computes the following two E-multiplications:
(CCiMi, σi) ⋆ (β, σ) := (Y, σiσ),
(C′CiMi, σi) ⋆ (β
′, σ) := (Y ′, σiσ).
Step 6: The HD computes:
s = (N/2)th column of the matrix Y,
s′ = (N/2)th column of the matrix Y ′.
Step 7: The HD sends Di the pair:(
C′M ′M−1C−1, s
)
.
Step 8: The device Di computes the matrix and vector
multiplications:
s′ = Ci
(
C′M ′M−1C−1
)
C−1i · s
which it can do since it knows its private key Ci and has
received C′M ′M−1C−1 and s from the HD.
Shared Secret: The shared secret is the column vector
s′ known to both HD and Di.
Step 9: The final step is to authenticate the device
Di. It is enough to verify that the HD and Di have
obtained the same shared secret. Methods for doing this,
such as using a hash to create a validation value or using
a nonce and Message Authentication Code (MAC) in a
challenge/response protocol are well known, so we do not
reproduce them here.
It is not at all obvious that the column vector s′
produced by the HD and Di have to be the same. We
now provide a proof of this.
First of all, the braids β and β′ commute with βi,
since they are formed from the sets of conjugates Cα, Cγ ,
respectively, and these sets of conjugates commute. It
follows from step 5 that
(CCiMi, σi) ⋆ (β, σ) =
(
CiCM,σ
)
⋆ (βi, σi) = (Y, σiσ),
(C′CiMi, σi) ⋆ (β
′, σ) =
(
CiC
′M ′, σ
)
⋆ (βi, σi) = (Y
′, σiσ).
Now, define an unknown matrix X by the formula
(1, σ) ⋆ (βi, σi) = (X, σi) .
It follows that
Y = CiCMX, Y
′ = CiC
′M ′X.
Next, define a column vector x where
x = (CiCM)
−1 · s.
The column vector x is just the (N/2)th column of the
matrix X . Hence
s′ = CiC
′M ′ · x = CiC′M ′M−1C−1C−1i · s.
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VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF IRONWOOD
The Ironwood protocol is an outgrowth of the Alge-
braic Eraser TM key agreement protocol (AEKAP) first
published in [1] in 2006. The security of the AEKAP was
based on the difficulty of inverting E-multiplication and
the hard problem of solving the simultaneous conjugacy
search problem for subgroups of the braid group. The
AEKAP had withstood numerous attacks (see [8], [9],
[10], [12], [14], [18]) in the last 10 years. However, the
recent successful attack of Ben-Zvi, Blackburn, Tsaban
(BBT) [6], for small parameter sizes, requires an increase
in key size (see [2]) to make AEKAP secure against the
BBT attack.
The Ironwood protocol was designed to be totally
immune to the BBT attack [6] without compromising
on key size, speed or power consumption. A necessary
requirement for the security of Ironwood is that the T-
values which are distributed to the Home Device cannot
be obtained by an adversary. The T-values are not on any
of the other devices Di in the network. Without knowing
the T-values the BBT attack [6] cannot proceed at all.
It is also clear that the Ironwood protocol satisfies the
last requirement of an MKAAP that if an attacker can
break into one of the devices Di and obtain its private key,
then only the security of that particular device is breached,
all other devices remain secure. This is because the only
secret information on the device Di is the private key Ci.
Knowledge of Ci has no affect on the key agreement and
authentication protocol between the HD and other devices
Cj with j 6= i.
Invalid Public Key attack
The devices Di in the network are subject to an invalid
public key attack of the type presented in [7] under
the assumption that an adversary can impersonate the
Home Device (HD) and run the Ironwood authentication
protocol (using invalid public keys) with a device Di. This
type of attack can be easily defeated (see [5]) provided
the Di uses a hash to create a validation value that does
not reveal the shared secret in any way or the Di uses
a nonce and Message Authentication Code (MAC) in a
challenge/response protocol.
In the reverse case, where the devices Di are attempting
to authenticate the HD, if an HD reveals s to an attacker
using an invalid key attack it may lead to potential
leakage. There are two approaches to protect against an
invalid public key attack against an HD. In the first case,
the device Di would have its public key signed by a
trusted CA/TTP. This would ensure to the HD that the
public key is valid by checking the certificate. In the
second case the HD must check that the public key is not
invalid before releasing s. To do this it must ensure that a
sufficient number of elements in the public key matrix are
not zero. With a sufficient number of non-zero entries the
E-Multiplication process will ensure a sufficient mixing
in the resulting computations, eliminating the possibility
of using linear algebra to obtain information about the
private key of the HD.
In both cases the use of single-use ephemeral keys
prevent an attack. If an attacker works against an HD
(or a Di) which uses a single-use ephemeral key then
multiple invalid-key attacks would always return unique
responses.
Length Attacks and Simultaneous Conjugacy Search At-
tacks
Although AEDSA has withstood length attacks and si-
multaneous conjugacy search attacks (see [12]) of the type
presented in [8], [9], [14], [18], these attacks completely
fail for Ironwood. This is because it is assumed that
the two sets of conjugates, Sα,Sγ , are not known to an
adversary. These two sets of conjugates are not in memory
on any of the devices Di, and only one of the sets Sα
is in memory on the HD. An assumption of Ironwood is
that an adversary cannot obtain secret information stored
on the HD.
A Class of Weak Keys
It is crucial that Ci does not commute with M ′M−1.
Otherwise an adversary can compute
s′ = (C′M ′) · (CM)−1 · s.
Similarly, it is also crucial that Mi does not commute with
(C′M ′) · (CM)−1. Otherwise an attacker can compute
s′ = (CiMi) · (C′M ′)−1 · (CM) · (CiMi)−1 · s.
The probability that one of the above commuting occurs
is very small.
Quantum Resistance of Ironwood
The Ironwood MKAAP and underlying E-
Multiplication are resistant to known quantum attacks.
The following sections provide an overview and analysis.
Resistance to Shor’s Quantum Algorithm:
Shor’s quantum algorithm [20] enables a sufficiently large
quantum computer to factor numbers or compute discrete
logs in polynomial time, effectively breaking RSA, ECC,
and DH. It relies on the existence of a fast quantum
algorithm to solve the Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP)
when the hidden subgroup is a finite cyclic group. It is
known that HSP can be solved on a quantum computer
when the hidden subgroup is abelian [22].
Ironwood, but more specifically E-Multiplication, are
constructions based on the infinite non-abelian braid
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group. In fact, the braid group is torsion free and, hence,
has no finite subgroups. As a result, there seems to be no
way to apply Shor’s algorithm to attack Ironwood.
Resistance to Grover’s Quantum Search Algorithm:
Grover’s quantum search algorithm [21] allows a Quan-
tum computer to search for a particular element in an
unordered n-element set in a constant times
√
n steps as
opposed to a constant times n steps required on a classical
computer. Resistance to Grover’s search algorithm re-
quires increasing the search space. Since E-Multiplication
scales linearly, this means that if an attacker has access
to a quantum computer running Grover’s algorithm, it is
only necessary to double the running time of Ironwood to
maintain the same security level that currently exists for
attacks by classical computers. In comparison, the running
time of ECC would have to increase by a factor of 4 since
ECC is a based on a quadratic algorithm.
Brute Force Attacks on the Ironwood Key Agreement
Protocol
We now discuss the security level of the individual
secret components in the Ironwood protocol. For accuracy
we give the following definition of security level.
Definition VI-A: (Security Level): A secret is said to
have security level 2k over a finite field F if the best
known attack for obtaining the secret involves running
an algorithm that requires at least 2k elementary oper-
ations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division) in
the finite field F .
We assume that Ironwood is running on the braid
group BN over the finite field Fq . Note that there qN
polynomials of degree N − 1 over Fq . So a brute force
search for a particular polynomial of degree N − 1 over
Fq has security level qN .
• The brute force security level of the matrix Ci is qN .
• The brute force security levels of the matrices C,C′
are qN .
The T-values is a set of field elements {τ1, τ2, . . . , τN}
where none of the τi = 0 or 1.
• The brute force security level of the T-values is (q−
2)N .
Note that the size of the public keys Pubi of the devices
Di is N2 · log2(q)+N log2(N) and the size of the public
key of the HD is (N2 +N) · log2(q). We can thus assert
• The brute force security level of the exchanged key
is 2N log2(q) = qN .
The ephemeral private braids β, β′ of the HD are
conjugates in the BN . The number of all braid words
of length L which are conjugates is ≥ (L/2)N−1.
• The brute force security level of the private braids
β, β′ is ≥ (L/2)N−1.
It follows that the brute force security level of the
Ironwood key agreement protocol is at least
min
(
(q − 2)N , (L/2)N−1) .
If we choose L ≥ 2(q − 2)1− 1N then the brute force
security level of of the Ironwood key exchange protocol
is at least (q − 2)N .
VII. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE
For testing purposes Ironwood was implemented on
multiple platforms. Because the Other Devices only need
to perform a single matrix multiplication and a single
vector multiplication, we focused our effort on the re-
quirements of the Home Device, as those operations
are more consuming and therefore more interesting to
explore.
Operationally the Home Device needs to perform two
sets of E-Multiplication operations (one with β and an-
other with β′), which take the majority of the execution
time. A single E-Multiplication operation in BN requires
N multiplies and N additions over the finite field Fq .
These operations, in turn, gets multiplied by the number
of Artin generators in each braid.
We generated key material using B16F256 for a pro-
posed 2128 security level. We generated 32 conjugates for
each set and from there generated key material for testing.
For this testing we generated 10 sets of Home Device keys
which averaged a braid length of 2659.2 Artin Generators
for β and 4302.4 for β′.
The first platform tested was a Texas Instruments (TI)
MSP430 16-bit (model) microcontroller. This platform
runs at various speeds from 8Mhz to 30Mhz (or faster).
On this platform we used the IAR (2011) compiler,
version 5.40.1 with Optimizations set to High and all
transformations and unrolling options checked. With this
setting the Ironwood Home Device implementation built
into 3126 bytes of ROM and ran with 354 bytes of RAM.
Running over the ten keys the MSP430 required anywhere
from 4,532,480 to 6,002,668 cycles with an average of
5,309,182. At 25MHz this equates to an average runtime
of 212ms.
The second platform was an NXP LPC1768 running
at 48MHz, which contains an embedded ARM Cortex
M3. We compiled our code using GCC (arm-none-eabi-
gcc) version 4.9.3 using optimization level -O3. This built
down into 2578 bytes of ROM and the runtime required
1192 bytes of RAM. Running the Ironwood shared secret
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calculation over the ten keys, this ARM platform required
anywhere from 1,538,472 to 2,026,216 cycles to compute
a shared secret, resulting in a runtime of 32.1 to 42.2ms
(averaging 37.4ms).
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE ON MSP430, LPC1768 (IN CYCLES)
Artin Length MSP430 LPC1768
|β| |β′|
2626 5272 6002668 2026216
2332 3580 4532480 1538472
2414 3944 4862464 1648742
3172 4266 5661952 1914009
2168 4514 5101824 1728545
3092 4698 5922048 2000312
2978 3968 5297664 1792959
2744 4420 5459456 1845502
2430 4762 5479424 1854446
2636 3600 4771840 1617670
2659.2 4302.4 5309182 1796687
The third platform was a TI CC2650, an embedded
ARM Cortex M3 running at 48MHz on TI-RTOS. On
this platform we used TI’s arm compiler (listed as TI
v5.2.0). It was configured at optimization level 4 (Whole
Program optimizations) with a size-speed tradeoff (SST)
of 5 (ranging from 0 to 5, 0 being fully size optimized, 5
being fully speed optimized). At this level the code used
3568 bytes of ROM and 1192 bytes of RAM. With this
setting Ironwood computed a shared secret in an average
of 37.4ms.
We also performed tests using the size-speed tradeoff
of 2, which resulted in a smaller code size of only 1954
bytes of ROM and resulted in a very minor speed penalty,
reducing the average computation time to 37.6ms. Note
that on this platform we couldn’t get a cycle count,
only a timer, and the timer API only has a 216 cycle
resolution timer, which means the timer increments every
216/486 = 1.37ms. This implies the timer results are +/-
0.7ms. However the times are still on par with the timing
on the LPC1768.
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE ON MSP430, LPC1768, CC2650 (IN MS)
Artin Length MSP430 LPC1768 CC2650 48Mhz
|β| |β′| 25MHz 48MHz (SST 5) (SST 2)
2626 5272 240.1 42.2 42 42
2332 3580 181.3 32.2 32 32
2414 3944 194.5 34.3 34 35
3172 4266 226.5 39.9 40 40
2168 4514 204.1 36.0 36 36
3092 4698 236.9 41.2 42 42
2978 3968 211.9 37.4 37 37
2744 4420 218.4 38.4 38 39
2430 4762 219.2 38.6 39 39
2636 3600 190.9 33.7 34 34
2659.2 4302.4 212.4 37.4 37.4 37.6
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced a new concept called
a Meta Key Agreement and Authentication Protocol and
defined an instance of this protocol called the Ironwood
MKAAP. We show how it resists all known attacks
against earlier key agreement constructions based on E-
Multiplication and how it is also quantum resistant against
Shor and Grover.
Implementations of Ironwood have been built and
tested on multiple platforms, and we have shown the
performance numbers achieved on three different plat-
forms leveraging two different architectures. Specifically,
we show that we can achieve a key agreement on an
MSP430 in 212ms and 37ms on an ARM Cortex M3.
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